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Gender and CEO Compensation 
Abstract 
The gender pay gap issues have long been debated. Prior research has shown 
significant or insignificant relations between gender differences on pay gap. This 
paper focuses on studying the relation of CEO gender on CEO compensation. We 
examine whether gender is related to both base salary and total compensation of 
CEOs. Further, by controlling for firm-fixed effect, we are able to come close to better 
understand the relation between gender and CEO compensation. In essence, 
firm-fixed effect analysis allows us to analyze whether in a particular company the 
gender of the CEO matters. Hence, whether a firm that employed a male CEO and a 
female CEO at some time during the sample period has shown variation in 
compensation that can lead us to suspect that it discriminated in compensation 
between males and females. 
The result of our paper finds no significant impact of gender difference on either base 
salary or total compensation of CEOs. However, there is a difference that we find in 
the salary mix - Female CEOs are statistically paid more in terms of base salary, 
which means the performance-based compensation of female CEOs is lower than their 
male counterparts. 
Key Words: CEO Gender, CEO Base Salary, CEO Compensation, Firm Fixed Effect, 
Regression 
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Introduction  
Gender difference in compensation has long been a controversial issue and many 
people assert that gender discrimination is an important obstacle for gender equality. 
In this study we try and address the possibility of a gender gap in CEO pay. On the 
fact of it, the argument of discrimination against woman is not without its critics. 
Women may earn on average less because they are employed at lower levels in the 
company. Because women often need to balance family and work life, it is not 
inconceivable that they are systematically less career oriented, leading to the 
systematic difference on pay. Controlling with different characteristics such as tenure 
and age may not suffice, because there may be unobservable systematic effort 
differences associated with gender (hence, women putting less effort in job and more 
effort in family). However, these explanations are less convincing when discussing 
pay of CEOs. By definition, CEOs are the most work oriented employees. They 
constitute the left tail of the pay distribution. A women CEO, who reached such a 
position cannot be considered family oriented as she had to surpass men to get to that 
position. Hence, a gender pay gap at the CEO level would suggest discrimination. 
Our sample of S&P 1500 firms (Execucomp firms) shows that the number of female 
CEOs has increased steadily over latest 20 years as shown in Figure 1. It also shows 
that the percentage of CEOs that are women increased. We find that the percentage 
increased over the time span 1992 to 2010 but dropped slightly in recent years till 
2013. Initially, the percent of female CEOs was only 0.69% in 1992. Then it doubled 
to 2.43% 8 years later. After that, it began to flatten out at 3% in the following two 
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years. Then, it peaked at 4.3% in 2010, followed by a slight fall to 3.5%. 
Figure 1 Female as a Percent of All CEOs 
 
In this article, we discuss the relationship between CEO gender and CEO 
compensation in a comprehensive aspect. We regress a sample of female and male 
CEOs compensation from 1992 to 2013. Besides, we add a series of controlling 
variables to reduce the concern of omitted variable bias. These variables include 
yearly dummy variables, CEO characteristics, industry dummy variables and firm 
characteristics. The more the controlling variables we added in the regression model, 
the smaller the sample is. However, we still maintain a large size sample consisting of 
11694 year-CEO observations. We also implement firm-fixed effect which reflects 
how female and male CEOs employed in the same company relate in terms of 
compensation. In this firm-fixed effect, we examine how gender relates to 
compensation in each firm, and we get a much higher adjusted R-square. Finally, we 
conclude that gender has no significant impact on compensation but with the base 
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salary and total compensation of female CEOs slightly lower than male CEOs when 
controlling years, CEO characteristics, and firm characteristics. This result actually 
means the compensation gap resulting from gender difference is negligible. On the 
other hand, we find a difference in salary mix – Female CEOs are paid a higher salary 
proportion in total compensation, while male CEOs have less amount of 
compensation made of fixed salary, which suggests that female CEOs have less 
performance-based compensation than male CEOs; the difference is statistically 
significant (t-statistic is 1.77). 
1. Review of literature 
Our paper is mainly motivated by prior literature released by Martin Bugeja, Zoltan P. 
Matolcsy, Helen Spiropoulos (2011). This study provides a background analysis of 
CEO gender and CEO compensation. They find no gender discrimination on 
compensation, including salary, bonus and total pay exist for female CEOs. Also, they 
stated that the minor difference on bonus paid to CEOs is not consistent with the 
popular assertion that females are risk-averse. Besides, Gender differences in CEO 
compensation: evidence from USA authored by Susan M.Adams, Atul Gupta, 
Dominique M.Haughton and John D.Leeth (2007) utilizes ExecuComp database of 
executives at 1,500 large US corporations from 1992 to 2004. This paper indicated 
that female CEOs were on average younger than male CEOs and female received 
similar compensation as male do at CEO level. On contrary, females received less 
compensation than males prior to them become CEO. Similarly, Jordan et al (2007) 
pointed out that the influence of gender differences on payments for CEOs does not 
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exist but does exist for lower level executives. Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) found an 
interesting phenomenon that if option is excluded from compensation, female CEOs 
are not underpaid compared to male CEOs, but if it is included, women CEOs are 
underpaid compared to their male counterparts. 
Prior literature about the relation between CEO gender and CEO compensation is 
limited and we also refer to papers concerning executives’ gender and their 
compensations. Gender differences in executive compensation: Variation with board 
gender composition and time written by Susan Elkinaway, Mark Stater (2009) used 
the same database as we did, but they only worked with time span from 1996 to 2004, 
which is much shorter than that of our sample. Their research objective is executives 
instead of CEO solely. They found an interesting result that larger firms are usually 
more male-dominated and females who climb to the top executive board work in 
small company in general. Also, they found female executive earn 4.5% to 5.5% less 
than male executives in base salary. Vieito and Khan (2012) documented that the gap 
of executives’ compensation diminished from 2000 and they found no significant 
differences in stock options awarded to male versus female executive. In this paper, 
the author additionally focused on technology companies since their CEOs, no matter 
female or male, are required similar skills and knowledge based on the unique 
professionalism of this area. The conclusion showed that in technology area, men and 
women executives have statistically insignificant difference on total compensation.  
2. Sample 
The analysis of gender and CEO compensation utilizes the WRDS Compustat 
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(Execucomp). In this database, a variety of information is provided, including annual 
compensation statistics such as each executive’s salary, total direct compensation 
(including salary, bonuses, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of 
stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts and all other total annual 
compensation), gender, job title, tenure as CEO, and company financial statistics such 
as sales and industry classification. We filtered the data downloaded by sorting out 
titles and unavailable total compensation, and only treated Chief Executives Officer 
(CEO) as our target, the processed data sample contains 1385 women and 48729 men 
employed as a CEO based on WRDS Compustat (Execucomp). 
Figure 2 Average CEO Compensation by Gender, 1992-2013 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the difference in CEO compensation between men and 
women has changed over time. Before 2000, the average female CEOs earned more 
than her male counterparts. The difference in 1999 is particularly significant, which 
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was about 4 million in total amount of direct compensation. During a 4-year period 
after 2000, the difference between female and male CEOs became minor, when 
female CEO got paid slightly less. Then, female CEOs’ compensation shrunk, 
considerably lower than their male counterparts between 2000 and 2008. However, in 
recent years, compensation gap narrowed again with a trend that female CEOs’ 
compensation rose and approached to a similar compensation position in which male 
CEOs have been. 
3. Descriptive statistics 
According to Table 1, female CEOs have higher significant base salary and higher 
insignificant log base salary than their male counterparts, whereas the log total 
compensation difference on female CEOs and male CEOs are insignificant. The fact 
that female CEOs having higher base salary but statistically equal total compensation 
implies their commission-based proportion of compensation (such bonus and option 
grants) is lower than their male counterparts. In addition, female CEOs are just under 
60 years old on average, about 7 years younger than the average age of male CEOs. 
Further, female CEOs on average have 2 years shorter tenure than their male 
counterparts. The differences in ages and tenures are significant from a statistics 
perspective. 
Sales, number of employees and market value are used to measure the size of a firm; 
return on asset, three-year growth rate of sales and three-year return to shareholders 
are proxies of corporate performance.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics on Compensation, CEO and Firm Characteristics 
Variables Full Sample Male CEOs Female CEOs 
Difference in 
Means 
(t-statistic) 
Compensation (n = 50114) 
Base Salary 
($ thousands) 
582.41 (374.570) 581.86 (375.313) 601.70 (347.003) -19.84 (-2.42)* 
Log Base Salary 
($ thousands) 
2.69 (0.280) 2.69 (0.280) 2.71 (0.268) -0.02 (0.47) 
Total 
Compensation
1
 
($ thousands) 
 3,885.53 
(7,409.523)  
 3.888.34 
(7,449.545)  
 3,786.89 
(5,830.309)  
101.44 (0.59) 
Log Total 
Compensation 
($ thousands) 
 3.30 (0.495)   3.30 (0.496)   3.32 (0.464)  -0.02 (-1.60) 
CEO Characteristics (n = 19401) 
Age 66.66 (9.187) 66.81 (9.187) 59.47 (5.648) 7.34 (2.64)** 
CEO Tenure
2
 
(Year) 
8.53 (7.159) 8.56 (7.184) 6.83 (5.622) 1.73 (2.79)** 
Firm Characteristics (n = 13618) 
Sales ($ billions) 3.63 (9.441) 3.65 (9.485) 2.63 (4.684) 1.01 (0.90) 
Number of 
Employees (# 
thousands) 
17.38 (42.362) 17.43 (42.547) 12.73 (22.589) 4.70 (2.50)* 
Market Value 
($ billions) 
4.29 (12.402) 4.30 (12.454) 3.30 (6.984) 1.00 (0.68) 
Rate of Return 
on Assets (%) 
3.56 (11.086) 3.55 (11.021) 4.17 (15.476) -0.62 (3.40)** 
Three-year 
growth rate of 
sales (%) 
17.92 (89.461) 17.96 (89.984) 14.33 (20.591) 3.63 (2.69)** 
Three-year 
return to 
shareholders 
(%) 
15.15 (25.505) 15.15 (25.486) 14.78 (27.030) 0.38 (2.69)** 
Notes: Each cell in the first three columns includes the mean value and the standard deviation (in 
parentheses), parentheses in the last column stands for t-statistic. Sample size is also provided. 
* Difference in means is significant between genders at 5% level. 
**Difference in means is significant between genders at 1% level. 
We found that firms managed by female CEOs are not necessarily significantly 
                                                             
1 Total Direct Compensation includes base salary, bonuses, restricted stock grants, stock option grants, long-term 
incentive pay and all other forms of total annual compensation. 
2 CEO Tenure represents the number of years in the position of CEO. 
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smaller but significantly behaved worse than those managed by males, proved by 
worse sales, small market value, slower growth rate and lower return to shareholders. 
However, one exception is firms having female CEOs have performed approximately 
0.62% better in rate of return on asset. Therefore, the conclusion is the base salary 
differs because of gender, but not true for total direct compensation. 
4. Methodology and hypotheses 
The research on the relation between gender and CEO compensation considering a 
series of CEO and firm characteristics is based on the regression model shown below. 
                                                                
                                                      
                                             
Yi stands for either the base salary or total compensation. The purpose of taking the 
natural logarithm is to reduce the impact of outliers. Log will decrease the skewness 
of the dependent variable and better mimic a normal distribution that is critical for 
regression analysis. Total compensation is composed of CEO’s salary, bonus and 
compensations such as the value of stocks or options granted. β0 is the intercept . β1 is 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is a woman or zero if the CEO is a 
man. βj to βn are coefficients associated with variables describing the characteristics of 
CEO, firm, industry and year. ϵi is a zero mean error term that is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables presented in the regression model. Also, it is noteworthy that 
compensation is adjusted for inflation when we processed the regression. 
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4.1 CEO characteristics 
CEO characteristics includes CEO’s age, age square, tenure (years as CEO) and 
tenure square, which are used to quantify CEO’s managerial experience and executive 
power. We calculated the square of age and tenure here is to examine the values of 
coefficients of these square terms, which describe the rate of change of total 
compensation or base salary as the age and tenure change at that point. 
4.2 Firm characteristics 
Firm characteristics are used for controlling for the size of a company or measuring 
corporate performance managed by a CEO. They are composed of net sales, market 
value, and number of employees, rate of return on asset (ROA), three-year growth rate 
of sales and three-year return on shareholders. 
Table 2 Average Salaries and Compensation by Gender and Industry, 1992-2002 
Industry N 
Fem. 
CEO 
% of 
N 
that  
are 
Fem. 
% of 
Fem. 
in 
Industry 
Avg 
Salary
 
Avg 
Salary 
Fem. 
Avg 
Salary 
Male 
Avg 
TC
 
Avg 
TC 
Fem. 
Avg 
TC 
Male 
Agriculture
 
55  0  0.00% 0.00% 316  0  316  1489  0  1489  
Mining
 
479  0  0.00% 0.00% 440  0  440  2184  0  2184  
Construction
 
107  0  0.00% 0.00% 510  0  510  4061  0  4061  
Manufacturing
 
5534  48  0.87% 29.27% 527  902  523  3313  10923  3246  
Transportation
 
1568  5  0.32% 3.05% 499  566  499  3453  5049  3448  
Wholesale 
Trade
 
360  0  0.00% 0.00% 455  0  455  2702  0  2702  
Retail Trade
 
1166  63  5.40% 38.41% 531  460  535  2989  1787  3057  
Finance
 
1213  7  0.58% 4.27% 603  323  605  5502  661  5530  
Services
 
1523  41  2.69% 25.00% 448  393  450  4070  2719  4108  
Non-classified
 
89  0  0.00% 0.00% 604  0  604  5481  0  5481  
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4.3 Industry indicators 
Based on the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes, data are divided into 100 
industrial sub-groups (the first two digits from 01 to 99)
1
. For the sake of brevity, they 
are classified into ten groups, shown in Table 2 and Table 3. The industries with the 
highest number of CEOs are manufacturing and services in each of the sample period. 
More specifically, the industries having the highest percentages of female CEOs are 
retail trade, services and finance, while no female CEOs are employed in agriculture, 
mining, construction and wholesale trade. Furthermore, by comparing Table 2 with 
Table 3, we found that the number of female CEOs in each industry increased 
substantially and the amount of average salary and average compensation for women 
are increasing from first to the second time period. Surprisingly, salaries and 
compensation in industries that relatively have higher percentage of female CEOs are 
not as low as people expected resulting from a concept of gender discrimination on 
compensation. Particularly, in finance, which ranks 1
st
 in both average salary and 
average compensation and 2
nd
 in average compensation during the first half and 
second half of the period respectively, many female CEOs are employed. Also, it’s 
interesting to notice that the percentage of female CEOs in the industry is actually 
positively correlated with the average salary in the industry in each period (the simple 
correlation coefficients are 0.13 and 0.42, respectively), but is changing from a 
negative correlation to a positive correlation with average compensation (the simple 
correlation coefficients are -0.02 and 0.34 in the first and second period). Thus, 
                                                             
1 Data are according to United States Department of Labor (https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html). 
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female CEOs are more concentrated in particularly high-paying industries. 
Table 3 Average Salaries and Compensation by Gender and Industry, 2003-2013 
Industry N 
Fem. 
CEO 
% of 
N 
that  
are 
Fem. 
% of 
Fem. 
in 
Industry 
Avg 
Salary
 
Avg 
Salary 
Fem. 
Avg 
Salary 
Male 
Avg 
TC
 
Avg 
TC 
Fem. 
Avg 
TC 
Male 
Agriculture
 
3  0  0.00% 0.00% 255  0  255  2490  0  2490  
Mining
 
315  0  0.00% 0.00% 616  0  616  4697  0  4697  
Construction
 
73  0  0.00% 0.00% 778  0  778  6746  0  6746  
Manufacturing
 
3198  81  2.53% 33.20% 678  577  681  4559  3534  4586  
Transportation
 
675  13  1.93% 5.33% 724  670  725  5089  2381  5142  
Wholesale 
Trade
 195  0  0.00% 0.00% 633  0  633  2898  0  2898  
Retail Trade
 
809  76  9.39% 31.15% 736  625  747  5051  2960  5268  
Finance
 
979  34  3.47% 13.93% 684  663  684  6009  4635  6058  
Services
 
1224  40  3.27% 16.39% 605  552  607  4346  4338  4346  
Non-classified
 
25  0  0.00% 0.00% 329  0  329  688  0  688  
To make it more clear, the comparison of female CEOs and male CEOs is 
demonstrated in the following bar chart (Figure 3). As a whole, female CEOs are not 
employed in low-paying industries such as agriculture, mining, and wholesale. 
Figure 3 Average CEO Compensation by Major Industry and Gender, 1992-2013 
 
Also, industries including wholesale trade and non-classified don’t have CEOs that 
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are women. For industries that both employ female and male CEOs, female CEO 
earns less in transportation industry, retail trade industry and finance industry while 
only gets paid more in manufacturing industry. 
5. Regression result 
5.1 Base salary regression 
In Table 4, all estimates for the values of coefficients of independent variables are 
presented. This regression model is used for studying the relation between log base 
salary and characteristics of CEO and firm. The first column suggests female CEOs 
have earned slightly higher than male CEOs; the difference is statistically 
insignificant. The result implies that age, age squared, tenure and tenure squared have 
significant impact on CEO base salary. A senior CEO is more experienced and tends 
to earn a higher base salary. However, the marginal effect of age is reducing as 
learned by negative coefficient on the squared age term. Similar results obtained for 
tenure – tenure increases compensation but the marginal effect of tenure is reducing.  
As one may expect, size is positively associated with compensation. Similarly, it is 
noteworthy that if a firm has more employees, CEOs’ base salary is statistically higher.  
This may be because larger firms can provide greater employment stability and more 
competitive compensation. Also, if a firm has a higher 3-year growth rate, CEOs’ base 
salary is slightly lower. An explanation of this fact is that CEOs are willing to 
sacrifice part of their base salary to boost the long-term development of a company, or 
CEOs earn higher performance-based compensation to substitute the loss of base 
salary. To reduce concerns of omitted variables bias, we controlled different firms. 
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Table 4 Regression Results of Base Salary for CEO 
Independent 
variables 
Y=log base salary 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
              CEO characteristics 
Female 0.0103(0.75) -0.0080(-0.58) -0.0063(-0.30) -0.0446(-0.52) 
Age 0.0213(9.06)** 0.0185(8.01)** 0.0299(11.62)** 0.0347(8.43)** 
Age squared -0.0001(-6.10)** -0.0001(-5.21)** -0.0002(-9.03)** -0.0002(-7.14)** 
Tenure 0.0170(25.77)** 0.0164(25.15)** 0.0074(16.25)** 0.0104(14.44)** 
Tenure 
squared 
-0.0004(-20.63)** -0.0004(-19.42)** -0.0001(-16.73)** -0.0001(-6.30)** 
              Firm characteristics 
Sales    0.0000(11.41)** 0.0000(4.96)** 
# of 
Employees 
   0.0006(7.55)** 0.0002(1.92) 
Market Value    0.0000(4.09)** 0.0000(-1.97) 
Return on 
Assets 
   0.0001(8.49)** 0.0004(3.82)** 
Sales 3 Yr 
Growth Rate 
   -0.0001(-5.49)** 0.0000(0.17) 
3 Yr Ret to 
Shareholders 
    0.0002(1.73) 0.0003(4.56)** 
Constant 1.484(18.93)** 1.586(20.56)** 1.182(13.04)** 0.939(6.27)** 
Firm control? NO NO NO YES 
Firm 
characteristics 
control? 
NO NO YES YES 
Industry 
control? 
NO YES YES YES 
Year control? YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19302 19302 11694 11694 
Adj. 
R-squared 
0.142 0.190 0.271 0.626 
Standard 
error 
0.274 0.265 0.238 0.170 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of base salary and salary figures are 
deflated by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each year (base year is 1992). 
Firm control in column 4 is according to GVKeys; industry control is by 2-digit SIC code. 
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
**Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
Age and tenure variables are still significant, while some firm characteristics become 
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insignificant. Overall, the adjusted R-square of these regression models increased and 
rockets to 62.6% when firms are controlled in our regression model. The result shows 
that female dummy variable remains insignificant all the time, suggesting that gender 
issue is not important for CEO compensation. 
5.2 Total compensation regression 
As can be seen from Table 5, female CEOs earned less than otherwise identical male 
CEOs when considering all variables (shown in column 4) but this difference is not 
significant in statistics. Alternatively, this means gender is not an issue relating to 
CEOs’ total compensation, the same conclusion drawn from log base salary 
regression. 
Other control variables are as follows. Age and tenure (years as CEO) increases total 
compensation but does so at a decreasing rate, since the values of coefficients on them 
are positive but on squared them are negative. Sales and three-year return to 
shareholders raise CEO compensation somewhat and have significant effect at the 
same time. 
Moreover, to see whether there are still remain unobservable effects that vary across 
firms but are constant over time, we redid the analysis using firm-fixed effect and 
considering different firms as control variables (column 4). We uncovered that not 
only the results on total compensation did not change but also it fits the regression 
model more finely (which can be drawn from the huge increase in adjusted R-square). 
In brief, the regression results provide no support for a gender-based difference in 
CEO compensation. 
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Table 5 Regression Results of Total Compensation for CEO 
Independent 
variables 
Y=log total compensation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
              CEO characteristics 
Female -0.0542(-2.23)* -0.0433(-1.18) -0.0570(-1.56) -0.0770(-1.35) 
Age 0.0440(10.57)** 0.0418(10.20)** 0.0493(10.79)** 0.0666(8.96)** 
Age squared -0.0003(-9.31)** -0.0003(-8.86)** -0.0003(-9.83)** -0.0005(-8.73)** 
Tenure 0.0175(15.05)** 0.0165(14.33)** 0.0037(4.60)** 0.0104(7.95)** 
Tenure squared -0.0005(-13.57)** -0.0004(-13.24)** -0.0001(-6.03)** -0.0001(-2.30)* 
              Firm characteristics 
Sales   0.0000(11.34)** 0.0000(8.50)** 
# of Employees   0.0009(6.26)** 0.0005(2.36)* 
Market Value   0.0000(8.87)** 0.0000(0.53) 
Return on 
Assets 
  0.0007(3.31)** 0.0001(0.31) 
Sales 3 Yr 
Growth Rate 
  -0.0001(-1.94) 0.0000(-0.76) 
3 Yr Ret to 
Shareholders 
    0.0023(14.52)** 0.0023(16.99)** 
Constant 1.241(8.97)** 1.309(9.60)** 1.014(6.29)** 0.341(1.26) 
Firm control? NO NO NO YES 
Firm 
characteristics 
control? 
NO NO YES YES 
Industry 
control? 
NO YES YES YES 
Year control? YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19302 19302 11694 11694 
Adj. R-squared 0.114 0.167 0.283 0.620 
Standard error 0.483 0.468 0.423 0.308  
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation and the 
compensation figures are deflated by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each year (base 
year is 1992). Total Compensation includes base salary, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, 
long-term incentive pay, and all other forms of total annual compensation. 
Firm control in column 4 is according to GVKeys; industry control is by 2-digit SIC code. 
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
**Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
5.3 Salary mix regression 
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 Table 6 Regression Results on Ratio of Salary in Total Compensation for CEO 
Independent 
variables 
Y = salary/total compensation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
              CEO characteristics 
Female 0.0313(2.54)** 0.0129(1.05) 0.0088(0.44) 0.0518(1.77)* 
Age -0.0213(-10.13)*** -0.0209(-10.01)*** -0.026(-10.59)*** -0.0340(-7.30)*** 
Age squared 0.0002(10.59)*** 0.0002(10.42)*** 0.0002(11.31)*** 0.0003(8.06)*** 
Tenure -0.0023(-3.85)*** -0.0019(-3.16)*** 0.0028(6.20)*** 0.0000(-0.03) 
Tenure 
squared 
0.0001(6.36)*** 0.0001(6.42)*** -0.0002(-4.42)*** 0.0000(-1.63) 
              Firm characteristics 
Sales    0.0000(-5.43)*** 0.0000(-4.13)*** 
# of 
Employees 
   -0.0003(-3.89)*** -0.0002(-1.24) 
Market Value    0.0000(-2.78)*** 0.0000(2.55)** 
Return on 
Assets 
   -0.0003(-2.97)*** 0.0006(0.43) 
Sales 3 Yr 
Growth Rate 
   0.0000(0.79) 0.0000(-0.44) 
3 Yr Ret to 
Shareholders 
    -0.0015(-17.99)*** -0.0015(-17.84)*** 
Constant 1.12(16.02)*** 1.11(15.88)*** 1.31(14.84)*** 0.94(6.27)*** 
Firm control? NO NO NO YES 
Firm 
characteristics 
control? 
NO NO YES YES 
Industry 
control? 
NO YES YES YES 
Year control? YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19302 19302 11694 11694 
Adj. 
R-squared 
0.06 0.10 0.18 0.43 
Standard 
error 
0.24 0.24 0.23 0.19 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of salary in total compensation and the compensation 
figures are deflated by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each year (base year is 1992). 
Total Compensation includes base salary, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, long-term incentive 
pay, and all other forms of total annual compensation. Firm control in column 4 is according to 
GVKeys; industry control is by 2-digit SIC code. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
* Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 10% level. 
**Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
***Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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In order to know how much of total compensation is made of base salary, we perform 
salary mix regression in Table 6. Female CEOs have higher salary proportion in total 
compensation than their male counterparts; the difference in gender is statistically 
significant when firm-fixed effect is added (in column 4). The result suggests that 
female CEOs are actually more risk-averse because they were paid more fixed salary 
instead of performance-based compensation (such as bonus and options). 
Conclusion 
Gender pay gap is still a debated topic and many economic researchers and corporate 
managers are interested in knowing whether it exists. It is generally explained by 
several reasons, such as the explicit discrimination, differences in education 
backgrounds, different positions held by male and female or women’s career choices. 
In this paper, we focused on the top executive position CEO, analyzed the gender 
differences in base salary, total direct compensation and salary mix, and showed these 
differences vary within industries, firms and over time. 
We found that even though there is a decreasing trend of female CEOs in recent three 
years, the percent of female CEOs is still almost twice compared to a decade ago. 
With regards to total compensation, the average female still earns less than the 
average male, but the difference between them has shrunk noticeably and is not 
statistically significant. Besides, we found an interesting result that female CEOs earn 
more base salary than male CEOs and the earning difference is statistically significant. 
Given their minor difference in total compensation, female CEOs actually earn less 
performance-based compensation such as bonuses, stocks and options. A reasonable 
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explanation is female CEOs are more risk-averse than their male counterparts. On 
average, female CEOs are younger and hold the position for a shorter time than their 
male counterparts, and firms operated by female are not necessarily significantly 
smaller (in terms of net sales, number of employees, market value and return on asset) 
than those that are run by male. We also find some significant evidence that firms 
have better performance (by three-year growth rate of sales and three-year return to 
shareholders) if their CEOs are male. Besides, female representation in the position of 
CEO is found seldom occupied in agriculture, mining, construction and wholesale 
trade, and largely engaged in manufacturing, finance and services. Despite such 
differences, we still found no significant gender discrimination or bias on female in 
base salary and total compensation at CEO level. 
However, there are still limitations. First, using age and tenure as the proxies for 
CEO’s experience may partially torture the reality, since the relevant working 
experience is difficult to quantify and display. Besides, we are unable to definitively 
pinpoint the source of some disparities between men and women due to the lack of 
education, human capital, family status, and labor supply data. Second, the WRDS 
database only provides EXECUCOMP statistics of S&P 500 firms for the years 
1992-2013, we did not perform analysis on the small and medium-sized companies. 
Ensuring the gender equality in compensation is important, because female are 
entitled to be compensated fairly through equally hard work and contributions to firms. 
Persisting discrimination on female concerning relative compensation will discourage 
female and deteriorate the productivity and efficiency of labor market as a whole. 
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